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## Restoration, 1970–1984

The ideology of the *Lliga Regionalista* and, in general, of the political formations of Catalanism, base themselves . . . on a critique of the existing Spanish state.<sup>1</sup>

In the trajectory of western capitalism in the twentieth century, the early 1970s can now be seen as the high point in the power of the centralised nation-state. Capitalist transformation and internationalisation weakened established states, and permitted the growth of state-less nationalisms, as a response to these developments. Political commentators of all ideologies were surprised at the re-emergence of nationalist movements in the 1970s. This re-emergence can be productively compared with nationalist reconstruction in the late nineteenth century, which also had its origins in a period of economic transformation. Furthermore the conflicts that emerged within the British and French states with Scottish, Welsh, Breton and Corsican nationalisms demonstrated that these conflicts were not the prerogative of authoritarian regimes. If there existed a historic national identity it resurfaced with renewed vigour in the late 1960s and 1970s, a demonstration of the fact that nationalist phenomena are both products of a world economic system and autonomous products of the societies in which they are found. Areas such as the north-west of England and Asturias are vivid examples of territories that experienced economic hardship and displacement during these years, but were unable to mobilise their populations around their territories for self-protection. The great mobilising capacity of nationalism conveyed this contrast.

The forces that articulated Catalan nationalism changed greatly under the impact of the Franco regime. The emergence of Catalanism in the nineteenth century had been closely related to the uneven development between the territory and the rest of Spain. By the late 1960s, the gap between Catalonia and advanced areas in Spain had greatly narrowed. Equally, cultural transformation meant that by the early 1970s Catalonia exhibited a number of expressions: regime-based folkloric regionalism, high cultural expressions of Catalan culture and the populist Catalanism closely linked to the left. By the early 1970s, the goals of Catalanism were more widely accepted than at any previous time. Pre-Civil War, Catalanism had been subject to challenge and contestation, particularly by the left yet, as we have seen, Francoism determined a distinctive

outcome to the Catalan question. As the Catalan communists in the PSUC noted, 'the linguistic, cultural, social and political *Renaixença* is an irreversible fact'. Of even greater significance, it added, 'the battle for the national identity of Catalonia is a battle that has been lost by the regime'.<sup>2</sup> In the final years of Franco's regime, all areas of cultural expression were consolidated. At the beginning of the 1970s, the following publications published completely in Catalan: *Serra d'Or*, *Tele-Estel*, *Cavall Fort*, *L'Infantil* and *Patufet*, the last two focusing on children. The language had attained a small place within radio and television, and in the *comarcas* (regional districts) over 50 publications published articles in Catalan.<sup>3</sup> *La Vanguardia Española*, the principal Catalan newspaper published a weekly section devoted to reviews of Catalan literature and culture. As Jordi García-Soler noted, over the course of the 1960s the transformation in the position of Catalan culture had been 'considerable'.<sup>4</sup>

An extensive report on Catalan nationalism prepared for the civil governor of Barcelona in 1971 contains a detailed analysis of the three pillars of the nationalist opposition that had emerged during the course of the 1960s. It stated that the monastery of Montserrat 'constitutes the ideological bastion (of Catalanism), in the form of the password of Catalan separatism'. The *Banca Catalana* was considered to be 'the economic sustainer of the ideology. Its coercive power . . . has allowed it to increase its capital in a short time, from a hundred million to more than nine thousand million pesetas'. The third centre examined was *Omnium Cultural*:

Its hidden slogan could be 'cultural separatism'. It is the ideological redoubt of conservative Catalanism, and paradoxically, of the extreme left. We can distinguish two factions: the conservative group, of a nature parallel to the *Lliga*, and the extremists.

The conclusions drawn on the strength and extent of Catalan nationalism at the beginning of the 1970s by the regime and of the activities of the Catalanists were that they were 'faced with a movement that is perfectly organised, that knows what it wants, and it has to be recognised, [the Catalanist movement] makes good use of the means at its disposal'.<sup>5</sup>

The 'means at its disposal' was a reference to the growing organisational capacity of the movement. In December 1969, the *Comissió Coordinadora de Forces Polítiques de Catalunya* (Coordinating Commission of the Political Forces of Catalonia) CCFPC had been formed. The *Comissió* was followed, in December 1970, by the creation at the monastery of Montserrat of the *Assemblea Permanent d'Intel·lectuals de Catalunya* (Permanent Assembly of the Intellectuals of Catalonia).<sup>6</sup> Both entities, created in the context of the regime's show trial of ETA suspects known as the Burgos trial, accelerated opposition organisational strategy. The PSUC was by this point concerned with leading a moderate strategy of unity.<sup>7</sup> In tandem with the *Comissió*, the permanent assembly and the University Committee of the PSUC formed the *Assemblea de Catalunya* (Assembly of Catalonia), which was significantly held in a church in Barcelona.<sup>8</sup> The *Assemblea de Catalunya* in November 1971 brought together



over 300 representatives of clandestine political groups. It was 'the crystallisation of the unitary spirit'.<sup>9</sup> Its significance lay in it extending beyond parties to include sectors of the Church, neighbourhood and cultural associations. The PSUC, the primary influence in the *Assemblea*, being the largest party in terms of organisational capacity and militancy, extended its influence through the small towns and districts of Catalonia. The *Assemblea* was a dramatic demonstration of the unity of aims that existed amongst the political opposition in Catalonia. This unity was achieved several years before that of other opposition forces in the rest of the state. This unity would last until 1977 and would ensure that the meeting of Catalan demands became a state priority in the post-Franco era. The *Assemblea* was a tribute to the vitality of Catalan civil society, which had been reconstructed during the course of the 1960s. It also appeared to resolve divisions within the Catalan opposition that dated from the Civil War and its immediate aftermath and that had endured until the 1960s. The virtual invisibility of anarchism in Catalonia in the early 1970s made this unification much easier due to the revived strategy of 'popular-frontism' then followed by the PSUC. The PSUC came together with liberal nationalists and various groups of Leninists and Trotskyists in the creation of the organisation. The *Assemblea* was formed and led by the left.

The foundational document spoke of demands which would be the basis of Catalan opposition throughout the first half of the 1970s and into the transition era. These were political freedom (*llibertat*), the release of all political prisoners (*amnistia*) and the restoration of a Catalan autonomous government (*Estatut d'Autonomia*).<sup>10</sup> The latter policy was 'the most original formulation ... linking the demand for the restoration of the *Estatut* with the popular legitimacy of the anti-Francoist opposition'.<sup>11</sup> The positions of the *Assemblea* were echoes of PSUC discourse as it was elaborated over the course of the 1960s and represented the call for a complete rupture with the regime. The *Assemblea* brought together the union of social and national struggle and embodied the PSUC's self definition as a 'class-based national party'. For the party, the struggle of the working class was to be situated within the unitary framework of the *Assemblea*.<sup>12</sup> In this period, more than ever before, the PSUC ceased to be the communist party of old and through its transversal nature, ever more the vehicle for organising the new anti-Francoist opposition. The party became 'the motor and maximum protagonist of the Catalan unitary policy'.<sup>13</sup> The forces of conservative Catalanism initially remained apart from the *Assemblea*, due to its domination by the PSUC.

The final years of the dictatorship, a period that became known as the 'agony of Francoism', were marked, at a state level, by an increase in intolerance and repression, particularly in the periods 1969–1970 and following the assassination in 1973 of Luis Carrero Blanco, the Prime Minister and the chosen successor to continue 'Francoism without Franco'.<sup>14</sup> For those at the epicentre of the dictatorship, the association of the regime with Franco's mortality and uncertainty at the ability of Juan Carlos to continue 'Francoism without Franco' created an environment of personal insecurity. In its decline the regime began to wither to a hardcore of fanatics, a sector that became known as the

'Bunker'. This regime insecurity produced a variety of responses, from the prohibition of performances of the *Nova Canço* to the executions of 1974 and 1975.<sup>15</sup> The latter events brought about a dramatic international isolation of the regime as well as protests outside Spanish embassies.

The wider Catalan and Spanish business communities were also reconsidering their relationship to the regime. The dictatorship's unwillingness to reform itself ensured its exclusion from the European Common Market. This encouraged liberal elements of the bourgeoisie to seek allies amongst the non-revolutionary opposition. The discourse of elements of the left, particularly the PCE and the PSUC, encouraged this bourgeoisie to complete Spain's 'unfinished bourgeois revolution'. 'The existence of a fascist dictatorship makes possible ... that in the struggle for ... liberties, bourgeois and proletarians, republicans and monarchists, atheists and believers, socialists and liberals can coincide and coordinate their forces'.<sup>16</sup> Catalan and Spanish Communists continued to offer a discourse of moderation, and although large numbers of workers were mobilised around the *Comissions Obreres*, it was clear that orthodox Communists would not attempt revolutionary insurrection.

As a symbol of the fracturing of the Francoist monolith, at the beginning of 1970 the Spanish *Cortes* debated a new educational reform. The General Education Law referred to 'the incorporation of regional peculiarities', and for the first time since 1939 spoke of the 'cultivation of the native languages'. This shift on the part of the state was a reflection of what has been termed the 'tolerated presence of the Catalan language in teaching'.<sup>17</sup> Although the specific clauses that would permit the teaching of the languages of the periphery were rejected at this time, the fact of their inclusion and public debate was itself a landmark. Furthermore, the Spanish Minister of Education declared that 'the joyful reality of the experience of the vernacular languages, is not only recognised but is exalted as a linguistic manifestation of the rich cultural heritage of Spain'. The press in Catalonia was also involved in this campaign for the Catalan language, with favourable commentary and encouragement given to the strengthening of its legal position.<sup>18</sup> This was a further indication of an officially approved discourse on issues, such as the promotion of Catalan, that had once been seen as fervently oppositionist. It had become clear that the future inclusion of a provision for the state sanctioned teaching of Catalan could not be long delayed. As was noted by the Lawyers' College of Vic, 'this idea is completely different to what has been proposed before ... that one of the principal aims of education in Spain is the incorporation of regional peculiarities'.<sup>19</sup>

For the Catalanist cultural community, the teaching of Catalan was only the first stage in linguistic 'normalisation', as 'the only way that is really viable for the teaching of Catalan is *in Catalan*'.<sup>20</sup> The campaigns of *català a l'escola* principally promoted by *Òmnium Cultural* were vivid testimony to the reconstituted civil society of Catalonia. Numerous associations and organisations demonstrated their support and produced public statements in support of the campaign on the part of almost the whole Catalan cultural and intellectual community.<sup>21</sup> Since its foundation in 1961, *Òmnium Cultural* contributed to the transformation in the position of Catalan language and



culture. At the end of 1970, *Òmnium* had over 3,000 members, and a further 3,200 joined in 1971 alone. The *Delegació d'Ensenyament de Català* (Catalan Teaching Delegation) of *Òmnium* had already taught the language to between 9,000 and 10,000 students.<sup>22</sup> Over 230,000 would be taught Catalan by the organisation after Franco's death and *Òmnium* would be pivotal in preparing a new wave of teachers of the language which would greatly contribute to the linguistic normalisation policies adopted in the transition and beyond. As became increasingly clear, the transformation of the status of Catalan in the schools was only a question of time. This led *Òmnium* to embark on new campaigns to achieve further consolidation of Catalan cultural advance. As the president of *Òmnium*, Pau Riera, put it in a letter to the membership, 'our culture, full of vitality in all senses, continues to be diminished because of its abnormal status and [this] requires campaigning on a national scale'.<sup>23</sup> One of the main *sardana* organisations called for the *sardana* to be taught in schools, because of its 'educative value' and because 'we want our dance to bring to the people faith in the ideals that it represents'.<sup>24</sup> Principal amongst these new campaigns was one over toponyms. The origin lay in the call of the *Centre Excursionista de Catalunya* for the (re-)Catalanisation of the names of towns, villages, rivers etc. throughout Catalonia.<sup>25</sup> As has been seen previously, one of the first acts of the Francoist victors in the Civil War was the Castilianisation of toponyms. *Òmnium Cultural's* linguists provided advice on the preparation of this transition. As an indication of its transformed status with the authorities and incorporation of cultural Catalanism, *Òmnium* received enquiries from Francoist mayors and favourable press attention.<sup>26</sup> Thus each phase launched by *Òmnium* and other entities of civil society cemented the reversal of Francoist anti-Catalan policies.

The process of Church–state distancing, itself initiated in the Basque Country and Catalonia, had also begun to resonate within the wider Spanish Church. This disengagement from the dictatorship culminated in the Church as a whole publishing the document, *La Iglesia y la Comunidad Política* (The Church and the Political Community) in 1971. The document was a public statement of apology by the Church for being directly associated with Spanish reaction during the Civil War and thus it stated, 'with humility, we recognise and ask for forgiveness because we did not know at the time how to be true ministers of reconciliation in the bosom of our people, divided by a civil war between brothers'. The document, although it received majority assent was not however formally adopted by the Church because a two-thirds majority was required for its formal adoption. Even so, it resonated widely, particularly amongst the hard core (the *ultras*) within the dictatorship, who deemed it a betrayal of the regime that saw itself as having saved Spain for the Church in the Civil War.<sup>27</sup> In 1973, the further confirmation of the separation of Church and state in Catalonia came with the public pronouncement of Archbishop Jubany of Barcelona over the detention of 113 individuals associated with the *Assemblea de Catalunya*. 'It is possible to affirm on this occasion that the Catalan Church was on the side of the people'.<sup>28</sup> The Spanish Church as a whole declared itself against the use of the death penalty in 1975 in a document enti-

tled, *La Reconciliación en la Iglesia y en la Sociedad* (Reconciliation in the Church and in Society) though its pronouncements were ignored as was demonstrated by the executions of September 1975. However, the Catalan Church, like its Spanish counterpart was also experiencing a crisis. This was manifested in divisions between the conservative hierarchy and the lower clergy influenced by the movement of worker priests. The 1970s also demonstrated that the disproportionate influence of the Catalan Church over the Catalan cultural community had peaked.

What became clear in the period that led up to the death of Franco, was that there was a re-positioning of business, the Church and even sections of the army to permit a controlled transition.<sup>29</sup> Part of the context of this re-positioning was bourgeois anxiety towards an incremental growth in the protest of organised labour in every year between 1969 and 1976. In February 1976, Sabadell, a large industrial town outside Barcelona, witnessed an extraordinary strike that saw mass popular support and was testimony to the challenge faced by the authorities. This conflict became symbolic of the power of organised labour. This was deepened by the leftist optimism of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Vietnam War, the 'hot autumn' in Italy in 1969, the strength of organised labour throughout western Europe, all appeared to indicate the strong probability of leftist advance. As the enormous literature on the transition demonstrates, the sentiment of reformist elements at the epicentre of the Spanish state echoed the often quoted aphorism of Lampedusa, 'if we want things to stay the same, things will have to change'. As subsequently became apparent, the oil and economic crisis, the end of the Golden Age of the western economies, rising unemployment and recession, saw the gradual decline of organised labour. The Moncloa agreements of 1977 represented a recognition by the communist-led trades unions of Spain and Catalonia of the limits to their bargaining capacity, and enshrined a certain degree of employment security in return for compromise of their socio-economic power. It was testimony to the enormous contrast with the political situation of the 1930s. Following the coup attempt of February 1981, further compromise was obtained from labour in the agreement known as the *Acuerdo Nacional de Empleo* (National Employment Accord).<sup>30</sup>

Catalanism was a key beneficiary of the new correlation of forces in Spain. Due to the hostility of Francoism to Catalan nationalism, the incipient Catalan political class was more united in its aims for a post-Franco resolution than in other parts of the Spanish state. Catalan nationalism no longer carried a direct association between itself and the business class, as a prominent section of this business class was perceived to have undergone a cultural and political Castilianisation. Catalanism had attained for itself a populist thrust it had previously lacked and this, in spite of widespread Spanish-speaking immigration. As noted, the association of Catalanism with the right and hostility from the anarcho-syndicalist movement prior to the Civil War, no transversal Catalanism was possible. Although the political discourse of Catalanism became transformed by the dictatorship, it remained consistent with the nationalist strategy of the *Lliga Regionalista*. Catalan business sectors of the



1970s, whether nationalist or regionalist, did not propose or support an independent Catalan state and support for Catalan independence remained marginal even amongst the radical left. Whilst demands for self-determination were frequently seen on demonstrations they had little wider resonance.<sup>31</sup> In fact, the position of Catalonia within Spain was deepened by economic transformation during the regime, and by the development that took place in the Spanish economy as a whole. Catalonia could no longer feel uniquely bourgeois and industrialised, in contrast with a 'semi-feudal' Spain. The modernisation of the Spanish state, particularly from the 1960s, would have great implications for the future trajectory of the political movement of Catalanism. The increased centrality of Madrid in the post-Franco period would pose its own challenge in future decades, in particular to Barcelona and its claim to cultural dominance. The leading role of Catalanism in the modernisation of Spain that had been a key element within Catalanism prior to 1939 was no longer credible in a Spain that had itself modernised.

The political representatives of liberal or conservative parties were the Catalan political expression of the forces of Spanish liberal conservatism and monarchism who sought a replacement for the Franco regime without profound social and economic upheaval. Some of these Catalan figures had met Prince Juan Carlos in the course of the 1960s in an effort to encourage an understanding on his part of *el fet català* (Catalan social, cultural and political reality). Juan Carlos's nomination as Franco's successor in 1969 confirmed for the nationalists the importance of continued communication with the royal figure.<sup>32</sup> In many respects Catalan reformulation under the dictatorship was slow and incremental and can be contrasted with the radical turn adopted by a sector within Basque nationalism. Events such as the Burgos trial of ETA activists in 1970 and the widespread international publicity attained by ETA gave a false sense of the scale of the national question in Catalonia. The Burgos trial brought the eyes of the world on the Franco regime. In spite of finding a number of suspects guilty, the regime was forced to commute the death sentences. As ETA was fighting against a brutal dictatorship, the organisation received a strong degree of support throughout Spain amongst anti-Francoists and in Catalonia the context of the persecution of one national minority encouraged mobilisation in another.<sup>33</sup> As has been noted, the non-violent nature of Catalanism was due to the advances made by it since the 1940s. With the abandonment of guerrilla warfare in the late 1940s, no serious military challenge to the dictatorship would come from Catalonia. However the execution by garrote of the young anarchist Salvador Puig i Antich in March 1974 demonstrated that Francoism was determined to retain the monopoly of violence. The hard right within Francoism dominated the security and military apparatus and the regime was prone to ever greater division and factionalism as moderate Francoists sought renewal without social and political upheaval. One aspect of this strategy was to seek to displace the left from their dominant influence in the cultural sphere.

The *Assemblea de Catalunya* not only symbolised the left's acceptance of the demands for autonomy but it seemed also a demonstration that the left

believed it now dominated the Catalanist movement. The first elections held in the spring of 1977 confirmed a predominance of the left, yet this dominance, which had begun under Francoism, did not survive the politics of the transition. The activity of the *Assemblea* can also be seen as a part reflection of PSUC concern at its exclusion from future regime transformation. The party, as with its co-religionary the PCE, feared that after Franco's death there would be a 'Francoism without Franco', and although there might be gestures of reform, that is all they would be. Both the PSUC and the PCE felt keenly that any regime dominated reform programme would also be certain to exclude the forces of communism. The PSUC was also concerned at the growing capacity of the regime to adopt for its purposes the folkloric aspects of Catalan culture:

The authorisation of *sardana* dancing, permission to publish books in Catalan – subject, of course, to censorship, the possibilities of being able to speak Catalan in public, the new *Mancomunitat of Diputacions*, that is more or less being created, can only make the easily satisfied content . . . or perhaps the haute bourgeoisie that has linked its interests with the Francoism that oppresses us.<sup>34</sup>

The *Assemblea* then, influenced by the PSUC position, declared that it wished 'to make absolutely clear that for Catalonia, this [process of reforms] was not democracy and that any possible exit from the present political regime that does not recognise, as a minimal unarguable fact, the re-establishment of the principles and institutions created by the *Estatut* has no validity'.<sup>35</sup>

The above mentioned anxiety at the regionalist strategy pursued by the regime was also an expression of concern felt, particularly within the PSUC, that the regionalists would be able to form an alliance with conservative nationalism, without conceding the full range of democratic liberties (which included the legalisation of the Communists). During the course of the late 1960s, it is possible to trace the emergence of a 'regionalist' lobby within the bureaucracy and administration of the state in Catalonia. This regionalism came to be embodied by senior figures such as José María Porcioles, Mayor of Barcelona, Juan Antonio Samaranch and Eduardo Tarragona. These regionalist sectors within the regime intensified their incorporation of elements of Catalanism in an attempt to secure legitimacy. Symbolic of this regime tolerance and co-option of Catalanism was the event known as *Primer Festival Popular de Poesia Catalana* (First Popular Festival of Catalan Poetry), in April 1970 in Barcelona.<sup>36</sup> The festival had been given official permission by José María de Porcioles, who followed this in 1971 by officially re-establishing *Els Jocs Florals de Barcelona* (Floral Games of Barcelona), which until this time had taken place within the Catalan exile communities. This re-establishment had resonance amongst the Catalan cultural community, as *Els Jocs Florals* had been central to the Catalan cultural revival of the nineteenth century. Their restoration in the Catalan capital was seen as a profound symbol of Catalanist restoration. Furthermore, Porcioles made sure that their restoration took place in the *Saló del Cent*, which had been the venue of their original revival in 1859.<sup>37</sup>



Porcioles was a figure who believed that cultural Catalanism could be used as a bulwark of the regime (he had been a member of the *Lliga* during the Republic). His policy divided the regime figures based in Barcelona, some of whom believed that concessions to this cultural and folkloric Catalanism would encourage the growth of political demands and a political movement. The approach to cultural Catalanism pursued by Porcioles was representative of a division amongst the servants of the dictatorship in Catalonia as to the strategy to be adopted. In a wider Spanish context this division was replicated in the coalescence of two tendencies that came to be known as *aperturistas* and *inmovilistas*.<sup>38</sup> The former position reflected the belief in the necessity of Francoism to reform to survive and the latter faction encompassed those who resisted all concessions. The more perceptive and 'enlightened' elements in the regime recognised that whilst it had ended the 'anarchy' of the 1930s, it had to adapt to new social and economic forces. The second sector, the hard-line *inmovilistas*, believed that concessions were firstly a sign of weakness and secondly, they would have an inevitable logic to them that would lead to radical change. Indicative of the changed status of Catalan culture and the position of those who felt it could be used for purposes of legitimation is the fact that by 1975, *Òmnium Cultural* received correspondence (written in Catalan) calling on it to be the patron of Catalan language theatre organised by the cultural section of the *Movimiento*, the head of whom was himself a member of *Òmnium*.<sup>39</sup> This was of course an entity that had been prohibited by the regime between 1963 and 1967, demonstrating how the final phase of the dictatorship expressed contradictory tendencies regarding the advisability of working with cultural movements.

For those who increasingly saw themselves as representatives of the progressive business class, the Francoist security state came to be seen as increasingly irrational, and those who looked over the Pyrenees saw that a more functional environment for business was obtainable in a liberal democracy. In May 1970, Pere Duran i Farrell, of the metallurgical plant, *La Maquinista Terrestre i Marítima*, denounced the remaining measures of autarchy in the economy at the time of the negotiations between Spain and the EEC. At this time, *La Maquinista* had become famous for its labour militancy and Duran Farrell as someone who had opened channels of negotiation directly with the unions. Catalan business expressed modernising currents in *La Maquinista* conflict, yet in the same year the president of the Chamber of Industry declared 'we are in favour of those who are constructing the country. We are against those trying to destroy it'.<sup>40</sup>

In July 1972, 12 of Catalonia's principal economic organisations, which ranged from the *Cercle d'Economia* to the *Asociación Cristiana de Dirigentes* (Christian Association of Directors), signed a document that called for the full integration of Spain within the EEC. The future relation with the EEC remained an important concern for Catalan elites, who were in the vanguard of the cultural and political 'westernisers' within the Spanish state. This Europeanism extended throughout the proto-parliamentary Catalan political spectrum, from the nationalists and social democrats to the PSUC. As Pau Roig

noted in a conference at the *Comité Español de la Liga de Cooperación Económica* (Spanish Committee of the League of Economic Cooperation) in 1970, 'Catalans have looked to Europe since the eighteenth century and within Spain, Catalonia has acted as a bridge to Europe'.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, as Catalonia's principal business lobby pointed out, over half of Spanish exports went to EEC countries and the delay in Spanish entry was creating 'great uncertainty for business decision-making'.<sup>42</sup> These twin phenomenon, regionalisation and Europeanism, combined with the threat of ever-increasing labour militancy, became the bridge between the nationalists and the regime regionalists.

Those who saw themselves as Catalanists above all were increasingly prepared to see what could be obtained from within the structures of the state. The forces of extreme reaction viewed with concern this emergent tendency and these forces, particularly the security apparatus, had potentially the most to lose in any dramatic break with the regime, which would have an unknown destination, possibly leading to the trials of police officers and others for torture and crimes against humanity. The background to this incipient *pactisme* after 1973 was the context of the 'erratic reformism' of Admiral Carrero Blanco and later that of his successor Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro.<sup>43</sup> By this period of 1973–1975 it was clear that Franco would soon be dead, and that after his death everything was uncertain.<sup>44</sup> The members of the regime elite in Catalonia were prepared to make concessions in the expected changes that could lead to democratisation. They had been hostile to Catalan nationalism during most of the regime, but now viewed the rising demands of the largely Communist-led working class as posing a greater threat to stability than Catalanism. The working class in Catalonia, itself with a preponderance of native Spanish speakers, was more radicalised than at any time since the 1930s. The regime was now faced with a powerful labour movement and it is possible to detect a certain downgrading of security service vigilance towards Catalanist cultural activity.<sup>45</sup> The regime seemed unable to contain both nationalist and labour based protest and mobilisation. Reform, to the liberal bourgeoisie and the business sector of Catalan nationalism was understood to mean a modification and modernisation of the existing state structures. The aim, above all, was the 'return to normality', whereby the Spanish state would become a liberal, parliamentary democracy, along the lines of those formed in the rest of western Europe. The 'moderate reactionaries' in Barcelona, formed by the business class and their political representatives, were prepared to concede the restitution of the *Mancomunitat* which had brought together Catalonia's four provinces in 1914 in a proto-regional body. They looked to obtain a solution to the 'Catalan question' through a new regionalism and were also prepared to concede rights to the Catalan language. They recognised that the Catalanists were not seeking independence, but did want concessions.

The urgency to the re-alignment that was taking place amongst different sectors of the elites of Catalonia, was made more explicit by the impact of the world recession brought on by the oil crisis of 1973. Whilst in retrospect it was clear that this period was the end of the 25 year Keynesian Golden Age, the drop in economic growth was precipitate in the years post 1973. As during the Primo



de Rivera period and the transition to the Republic, the transition from Francoism to the as yet unclear new model of state would take place during a time of rising unemployment and economic crisis. In Catalonia the recession and unemployment would be the worst in Spain, second only to the Basque Country. This economic crisis naturally impinged on the political discourses of the period and it was noted that Catalan growth was its lowest since 1960, and was also lower than the Spanish average.<sup>46</sup> In the opinion of a clandestine nationalist publication: 'This situation is also harming Catalan capitalists and is in the first place a consequence of the administrative, financial and political centralism ... an autonomous administration of resources would immediately produce a greater rationalisation of investment.'<sup>47</sup>

The most public statement of the mobilisation of sectors of Catalonia's pre-political class was the meeting that became known as 'the spirit of the Ritz'. This can be interpreted as a Catalan response to the spirit of February 1974 of Arias Navarro, which permitted the creation of proto-political 'associations', providing they demonstrated their loyalty to the *Movimiento*. A sense of terminal crisis in the Francoist monolith was apparent as wide-ranging meetings took place bringing together disparate political positions: 'Representatives of decisive social and economic power in Spain have maintained conversations with men of opposed ideology. Prominent Catalan representatives came, from *Òmnium Cultural* and the business community, along with prominent conservative Catalanists.'<sup>48</sup> The conversations that took place also included a prominent member of the PSUC, a confirmation that the function of this formation would be the containment of labour demands. As with the PCE, the PSUC would be influenced above all by Italian communism both in terms of the strategy of *sorpasso* of social democracy and strategic alliances with conservatives and Christian democracy in a bid to isolate the far right.

By the early 1970s, Jordi Pujol had come to embody the Catalan nationalist movement for both the regime and the opposition. As an indication of his importance and symbolism, Pujol was invited to attend a meeting in May 1974 called the *Reunión Democrática*, which included two Spanish generals, the leader of the Spanish Communists, Santiago Carrillo, and the former Francoist minister, Manuel Fraga.<sup>49</sup> Equally, in 1973 Pujol led the purchase of the former Carlist daily *El Correo Catalán* and early in 1975 purchased the influential cultural and political weekly *Destino*, providing a media platform for his nationalism. A dual strategy was in place: the Pujolist nationalists had an aura of opposition in the popular mind, yet behind closed doors negotiations proceeded apace between Catalanists and *aperturistas*. In June 1974 Pujol was invited to speak at Barcelona's business school, ESADE, on '*L'entorn cultural, polític i econòmic de l'empresa a Catalunya i probable evolució*' (The cultural, political and economic environment for business in Catalonia and its probable evolution). At the conference Pujol stated, 'the most important development of the Catalan economy has been almost always produced through private enterprise, under the existence of a strong political regime, with labour tranquillity, the expansion of the western economy, tariff protection and with the social consideration of the entrepreneur, [who] is the creator of wealth'.<sup>50</sup> Yet

five months later, the Pujol-led creation, *Convergència Democràtica*, would describe itself as a movement of the centre-left. The discourse of the *Convergents* remained distinct depending on the forum.

At the end of 1973, Jordi Pujol and Anton Canyellas, the principal figure in *Unió Democràtica*, agreed to begin the creation of a new political formation of Catalan nationalism. Canyellas had a large financial stake in the Catalan publisher, *Nova Terra*, and was a prominent figure in nationalist circles. Canyellas agreed with Pujol that *Unió Democràtica* was too narrowly based to be the foundation of a Catalan nationalist formation. A broader-based nationalist grouping was proposed and it was decided to include the social democrats of the *Reagrupament* faction of the various Catalan socialist groups. Throughout the Spanish state in the early 1970s, from the PSOE to Spanish monarchists, new or revived political formations were created. In Catalonia, not only was *Convergència Democràtica* formed in this era, but also *Esquerra Democràtica de Catalunya* (Democratic Left of Catalonia), the *Partit Socialista de Catalunya* (Socialist Party of Catalonia) and *Convergència Socialista de Catalunya* (Socialist Convergence of Catalonia). *Esquerra Democràtica* was founded by the Catalan free-market economist Ramon Trías Fargas as a liberal Catalanist party. Trías Fargas was closely connected to the *Banco Urquijo* and would subsequently fuse his party with CDC. The name of the party and Pujol's invoking of the Scandinavian model and centre-left were testimony to the discredit brought upon by the 'right' by the long night of Francoism. The decision to call the new creation *Convergència Democràtica* had been taken after Pujol had sent one of his close associates, Josep Miró i Ardevol, a member of *Unió Democràtica*, to report on the Portuguese revolution of 1974. Miró was impressed by the role played in Portuguese events by *Convergència Monárquica*. The decision was made to call the new creation *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* rather than the other option which was to call it the *Partit Nacionalista Català* (Catalan Nationalist Party). Those that founded *Convergència* were overwhelmingly native Catalans and unlike other Catalan parties of the period, the non-presence of immigrants was striking. The first secretariat was formed by Jordi Pujol, Anton Canyellas, Joan Carrera, Miquel Roca, Jaume Casajoana and Josep M. Culler and these would be the key figures to lead the party into the transition and, in 1980, into power.

In the initial acts of *Convergència*, prominence was given to photographs of Prat de la Riba, Francesc Macià and Lluís Companys. The iconography made clear the transformation in the Catalan nationalist canon that had occurred under Franco. All were seen as transcendent national figures and the *Lliga Regionalista* as represented by Francesc Cambó was notable by its absence. Rather, *Convergència* sought a national reconstruction that would combine the political moderation of Prat de la Riba's *Mancomunitat* and the populist inter-classism of the *Esquerra* of Companys and Macià. *Convergència* saw itself as the political expression of moderate Catalanism. As mentioned, *Convergència Democràtica* initially defined itself as a social-democratic organisation of the centre-left. It proposed, as a political and economic model, Scandinavian welfare capitalism. The intention in this programme was to appeal politically



in a context in which leftist ideology seemed dominant. Yet the leap from Francoist authoritarian welfare capitalism to the Swedish model was not a great one and would have been achieved without great trauma. Furthermore, in the early 1970s, from Nixon's United States to the Britain of Heath and Wilson, governments remained committed to Keynesian welfarism. It would not be until the end of the decade that this consensus would be broken and CDC would be pivotal in the liberalisation of the economy in preparation for entry into the EEC. The period between 1975 and 1985 would be marked by a dramatic restructuring of the economy with severe crisis experienced by traditional Catalan industry. *Convergència's* radicalism in the mid 1970s was not, in fact, very deep: 'There is only one thing worse than having a bourgeoisie, and that is not having one.'<sup>51</sup> Almost all of the opposition to Franco in the 1970s included various forms of leftism in their programme and were a reflection of the belief that the end of the regime might bring about some form of social transformation. This adoption of progressive ideas was only superficial and was quietly dropped as the parties entered the arena of electoralism. Francoism meant of course the right (*la derecha*), and those who were non-leftists adopted the centre and centre-left as terrains for their discourse. In the words of one commentator, Pujol was 'a liberal of the right whilst pretending to be a man of the left'.<sup>52</sup>

The immediate background to the period termed the 'agony of Francoism' was the deepening economic crisis throughout Spain.<sup>53</sup> The indicators of this crisis are revealed in the figures for economic growth at the end of the dictatorship: it declined to 5.4 per cent in 1974 and dropped to 1.1 per cent in 1975. The long Spanish economic boom that had begun in the early 1960s was at an end. Both the Catalanist and Castilianised business class were acutely conscious of the close economic links between Catalonia and the rest of the state, and rejected anything that smacked of a break with the Spanish market. In his conference at the business school, ESADE, Pujol had said in effect that the Catalanist project of *Convergència* was good for business and, as an individual who had proven himself in Catalan banking, he could be trusted with the impending reform of the Spanish state. Jordi Pujol visited Prince Juan Carlos in March 1975, a demonstration of his singular importance within the Catalan national movement. His task was to inform the prince of the situation in Catalonia and the importance of recognition of the restoration of a form of Catalan autonomy. As a further indication of the shifts that were occurring within the centres of regime power in Catalonia, in January 1975 the Catalan flag, the *senyera*, was permitted to fly again from the building of the *Generalitat* in Barcelona. The Catalan flag had a different historical origin from that of the Basque *ikurrina*, which was directly associated with the PNV, having been the creation of the party founder, Sabino Arana, in the late nineteenth century. The Catalan flag, as the symbol of the medieval crown of Aragón, which had encompassed the Balearics, Valencia, Catalonia and Aragón, had remained as part of the Spanish coat of arms throughout the Franco regime. Further indicative of impending change, in March 1975, the *Diputació* of Barcelona approved the organisation of correspondence courses in Catalan and agreed to

allow funding for the *Institut d'Estudis Catalans* (Institute of Catalan Studies) to be included in its budget. However, as an indication that divisions still remained within the regime establishment, the city council of Barcelona rejected a provision for Catalan language teaching.<sup>54</sup>

In September 1975, the Franco regime demonstrated to the world that, whilst Franco remained alive, *apertura* meant little. In an act that symbolised his accession to power during the Civil War, Franco authorised the execution of six members of ETA and the FRAP, a radical communist armed group. The result was attacks on Spanish property and embassies and the suspension of further negotiations between the EEC and the Spanish state. It was almost inconceivable that Franco himself would permit the restoration of an autonomous government for Catalonia. He remained until his death extremely conscious of the symbolism of all political actions and the words *Estatut* and *Generalitat* remained for him as part of the 'disastrous legacy' of the 1930s and principal causes of the slide to civil war. By the final year of Franco's life it was clear that further advance for Catalan nationalism would have to await his death. There was, however, no doubt that Catalonia as a society had developed a strong sense of itself as a nation. The popular resonance and the acceptance of the demands of the *Assemblea de Catalunya* was a demonstration of this fact.

During the course of 1974–1975, 66,000 students were taking Catalan courses in over 300 schools in Catalonia. Furthermore, in greater Barcelona, the majority of these students came from Spanish-speaking families. It was noted by *Omnium's* governing body that the interest from these families was 'notable' and that 'the teaching of Catalan has produced results that nobody can ignore'. At this time, the councils of Terrassa, L'Hospitalet, Sabadell and Granollers (themselves heavily populated by native Spanish speakers) were providing Catalan-language courses.<sup>55</sup> To reach rural Catalonia, *Omnium* created the '*Cultura en Ruta*' campaign, which by travelling around the small towns and villages promoted cultural awareness and sold almost 110,000 books and 12,000 records by early 1975.<sup>56</sup> *Omnium's* membership had also risen to 17,000. The organisation of the *Congrés de Cultura Catalana* (Congress of Catalan Culture) in 1975, and its constitution in 1976 was a vivid symbol of the work of 'national re-construction' that would be undertaken in the following years.<sup>57</sup> The *Congrés* brought together sectors of Catalan cultural and civic life that included the *Gran Enciclopèdia Catalana*, *Omnium Cultural*, and a variety of professional organisations.<sup>58</sup> 'The preparation of the *Congrés de Cultura Catalana* appears as an important act of the people.'<sup>59</sup> The *Congrés* would lay the foundations for cultural policy and the contours of revival that would be implemented with the restoration of self-government in the late 1970s.<sup>60</sup>

In the period 1975 to 1977, at the time of popular mobilisation for the restoration of Catalan autonomy, the presence of immigrants from other parts of Spain who had arrived from the mid 1950s in pro-*Estatut* demonstrations was notable. In the late 1960s and early 1970s some of elements of the radical left had sought to appeal to this immigration through the Spanish language. At



the beginning of 1970, *La Vanguardia* reported the fact that a group of university students had chanted, 'Catalan is the language of the bourgeoisie'.<sup>61</sup> Whilst there were great national/class cleavages in demographically dominant Barcelona, they were not expressed in terms of Catalan/Spanish conflict. Inter-marriage was common. Although there was tension within communities which felt 'swamped' by Castilian immigrants, this did not reach Basque levels of divisiveness. The potential for division was enormous, as the Spanish-speaking population of Catalonia was approximately half of the total Catalan population. The standard statement of Catalan nationalism in relation to the Spanish speakers was that 'all who live and work in Catalonia are Catalan'. Associated with this fundamental idea was that these communities have to accept *el fet català* (Catalan reality). Indicative of concern, the nationalist information service, *Avui*, referred to the creation of the *Casa de Andalusia* (Andalusian Cultural Centre) in Santa Coloma de Gramenet and stated 'it is vital to oppose the perpetuation of two differentiated communities'.<sup>62</sup> At the same time, towards the end of the transition, and related to the economic crisis, the Catalan population experienced some notable changes, bringing to an end the demographic boom that had begun in the early 1950s. Migration to Catalonia almost completely ended and in some years the population actually declined. The birth rate, which had been an important expression of Catholic Francoism, also collapsed. However, the project of normalisation of Catalan culture and language undertaken by the governments of Jordi Pujol faced problems distinctive to its predecessors and a relative demographic stability created a benign environment for the changes to come.

The demands of Catalan nationalism did not meet hostility from the Spanish-speaking population. This meant that the *Lerrouxisme* that existed in the early twentieth century did not resurface. The most notable feature of Catalonia through the 1960s was the failure of an anti-immigrant racist discourse to emerge. This was due to several factors. Firstly immigrant labour contributed to the economic boom and did not pose challenges to the employment of native Catalans. Rather, as has been stated earlier, indigenous Catalans benefitted from the enormous influx. Significantly, anti-Catalanism was seen as a product of the Franco regime and parties with 'centralist' traditions such as the PSOE became, in the early 1970s, better disposed to Catalan autonomy than they had been in the 1930s. At a popular level the function of Barcelona Football Club as a channel of Catalanism was vividly expressed at the match between Real Madrid and Barcelona in June 1970. The winning of the Spanish league by Barcelona in 1974 seemed to be symptomatic of Catalan self-confidence. The PSUC, in recognition of the opportunities provided by this forum, encouraged anti-regime crowd chants to coincide with the visit of Franco to Catalonia.<sup>63</sup>

The PSUC and the trades union body it dominated, the *Comissions Obreres*, played an important social role in the integration of immigrants. 'The Communists have to be at the head of those who put the national problem in first place, to develop an intense task of explanation and to be able to root out the still profound prejudices [towards Catalanism] that exist'.<sup>64</sup> The PSUC

continued to publish in Catalan throughout the dictatorship, though in recognition of the linguistic reality amongst its constituency, it often produced parallel editions in Spanish. 'Against Francoist assimilationism, we have to impose the usage of Catalan in the administration and in public places. In this way by concretely challenging Francoist legality we will make A MILITANT ACT OF NATIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC AFFIRMATION'.<sup>65</sup> Though some radical leftist sectors were hostile in their attitude towards the Catalan language, they were very small formations and it was the PSUC through the *Comissions Obreres* that was the principal agency of worker activism. The fundamental difference in the Catalan labour movement between the 1930s and the 1970s was the essential disappearance of the anarchist movement. The PSUC, since its creation in 1936 had given primacy to its Catalan identity, and had resisted submersion in the PCE. The anarchists, and particularly the radical faction of the FAI had been at the forefront of those who believed that Catalanism and nationalism were anti-revolutionary. This transformation in the political force that dominated the left also ensured that Catalan demands during the transition did not threaten the state.<sup>66</sup>

The fears expressed in nationalist discourse in the 1960s that the mass immigration could potentially lead to de-Catalanisation were not borne out. Most first-generation immigrants to Catalonia were not fully integrated, in the sense that they did not switch from Spanish to Catalan. More importantly though, they did not become hostile to Catalanism. The society that hosted them also provided them with greater opportunities of social mobility than that which they had left.<sup>67</sup> There was in fact, a national community within a national community, but a national community that did not mobilise as such. Within Catalonia there remained a visceral anti-Catalan element, which was centred in the police, Civil Guard and the *Falange*. However, there was almost no native or immigrant support for the sector known as the 'Bunker'. In spite of the large Spanish-speaking presence in Catalonia, the 'Bunker' was incapable of mounting a new form of *Lerrouxisme* around the discourse of Spain. The highly-mobilised working class came into ever-increasing situations of conflict, where it inevitably experienced the brute force of the security forces. It was this reality of shared repression that ensured immigrant understanding of Catalanist discrimination. In the census of 1975 in the area known as the *cinturó de Barcelona* (commuter belt), 54 per cent claimed they were unable to understand Catalan. However, due to the status associated with the language, these working-class communities expressed support for Catalan language campaigns. The town of Cornellà, which had a native Spanish-speaking population of 80 per cent, was a paradigm of a city that had a large immigrant presence, and joined the campaign of *Català a l'Escola*. As the PSUC commented favourably, 'it is interesting to note that amongst those who have signed up are included entities that are apparently as un-Catalan as the *Peña Fosforito* [flamenco association], the Real Madrid supporters club . . . and all of this in a town that is overwhelmingly immigrant'.<sup>68</sup> This is highly significant given the clear demarcation in status between those who were born in Catalonia and those who were not. In 1979, it was shown that 82 per cent of



semi and unskilled workers were born outside Catalonia whilst the highest occupational positions showed almost the reverse: 74 per cent were held by those born in Catalonia.<sup>69</sup>

Following the death of Franco in November 1975, the cautious dismantling of the regime was undertaken. The key component to the Catalan transition was for the winning of self-government within the Spanish state. The transition testified to the importance of Catalan institutions to the political culture. The demands then of Catalan society in the 1970s were for the restitution of the political autonomy which had been abolished by Franco. A direct association was thus made with the government of the 1930s. Notably, independence remained a marginal demand. All Catalan political parties called for the restoration of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. By the late 1970s, due to its minority status, the Spanish government of the UCD *Unión del Centro Democrático* (Union of the Democratic Centre) needed Basque and Catalan nationalist support to survive. During the years 1976 to 1980 three referendums and four elections were held in Catalonia. In assessing the transition to democracy as experienced in Catalonia, it is important not to underestimate the scale of popular mobilisation. As early as 1 February 1976, over 75,000 demonstrated in the city of Barcelona in an unauthorised call for amnesty for political prisoners.<sup>70</sup> In late October 1976 the Civil Governor of Barcelona banned a demonstration called to commemorate Lluís Companys, the legally elected president of Catalonia who had been executed in 1940. With the celebration of Catalonia's national day, *la Diada*, in Sant Boi on 11 September 1976, the unity of purpose amongst the Catalan opposition was again demonstrated. Catalan protest, combining Catalanist demands with calls for popular democratisation, continually mobilised the largest numbers of any protest culture throughout Spain. The first *Diada* held under conditions of democracy following the June 1977 elections on 11 September 1977 saw over 1 million publicly demonstrate in Barcelona. This became one of the largest mass demonstration in post-Franco Spain until the mobilisation against the Iraq war in 2003.

The first elections held in Spain since February 1936 took place in June 1977. It was notable that Spain's prime minister Adolfo Suárez who had controversially legalised the Spanish Communist Party a few weeks earlier had not legalised *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* by the time of the elections, above all due to the word 'republican' in the party name, testimony to the fragility of the monarchist restoration in Spain.<sup>71</sup> Whilst in July 1976, Suárez publicly recognised the pluralism of Spain, republicanism and criticism of the military or King remained taboos. In December 1977 the Catalan language theatre group *Els Joglars* were put on trial and sentenced by a military court for a play which challenged the military use of the death penalty. In spite of Spain having had democratic elections in June 1977 it was an indication of the continued control exercised over popular democratisation. These first elections in June 1977 could not be said to have taken place in a democratic society, since the governing party was able to ensure for itself media dominance and a public discourse of moderate change. The election took place in an atmosphere of economic crisis. The results in Catalonia demonstrated that the left in

Catalonia was, after Andalusia, apparently the strongest in Spain. One of the key political forces to experience defeat was that of the Catalan nationalist left. This defeat was testimony to the weakness of pro-independence sentiment and to that of greater Catalan (*Països Catalans*) identity.<sup>72</sup> These years would be marked above all in Valencia by the mobilisation of the anti-Catalanist right and the weakness of Catalanism in the Balearics.<sup>73</sup> Equally *Convergència Democràtica*, as the central force in the *Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya* (Democratic Pact for Catalonia), only obtained 16 per cent of the votes in the *Cortes* elections of 1977, which produced a high turn-out and seemed to indicate that the historic leftism of Catalonia had been maintained, though transformed.<sup>74</sup> The left in Catalonia won every Spanish and municipal election between 1977 and 2011 and seemed certain to take control of the *Generalitat* in 1980. Increasingly government attention in Madrid was drawn to Catalonia due to this dominant leftism. This coincided with Catalan business concerns at both capital flight and the demoralisation of the sector.<sup>75</sup> It was in this context that the re-organisation of Spanish business was led from Barcelona through the constitution of the employers' organisation, the CEOE *Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales* (Spanish Employers' Federation) in June 1977 which was led by the Catalan Carles Ferrer Salat.

The nationalists of the centre and right that came to be embodied in Pujol's CiU found their support in small companies and businesses, i.e. the petit bourgeois sectors of Catalan society, including shopkeepers, traders, small to medium-sized farmers in rural Catalonia and certain administrative grades.<sup>76</sup> Pujolism bore similarities with movements as varied as Gaullism in France and *Fianna Fáil* in Ireland in its curious combination of conservatism, nationalism and mobilising capacity, above all outside of the urban areas of the country. Pujolism had something of the classic appeal of petit bourgeois political movements, including its anti-metropolitan and anti-intellectual elements. Equally the natural terrain of Catalanism was seen to be the land, whether Montseny or Montserrat, embodying a pure national essence. This was in contrast to urban cosmopolitan Barcelona. Pujol carefully constructed what can be termed a new common sense in contrast to his political rivals on the left, who were described as being immersed in radical ventures. As for the Spanish centre-right conservatives of the UCD, they were increasingly torn apart by factionalism. Over the course of the late 1970s, Pujol and CiU gradually abandoned the initial rhetoric of being of the centre-left and came to embrace the newly resurgent free-market liberalism. Pujolism in power sought to create an all-powerful hegemonic new reality and whilst it attained notable influence in the cultural realm, sectors of banking and the business organisation, *Foment del Treball Nacional*, remained outside of its orbit of influence. Of more importance however was the construction of two Catalonias: the autonomous government and small towns of the interior under the influence of CiU, and urban and industrial Catalonia that was represented by Catalan socialism and the PSUC. One mayor of the town of Vic in the heartland of nationalist Catalonia stated that 'Catalonia begins in Vic', implying that Barcelona represented a fuzzy cosmopolitan modernity.<sup>77</sup>



By taking control of the city of Barcelona in 1979 as well as most of the municipal governments, the PSC was able to construct a parallel power base to CiU. This led to particularly poor relations between the two principal forces in Catalan political life and to regular clashes between the *Generalitat* and the socialist municipal areas. The socialists did not lose control of the city of Barcelona until 2011 and from the 1980s the city attained for itself a higher international profile than the land to which it belonged and was capital of, Catalonia. Other variables impacted too. Francoism, like many dictatorships, had achieved a relatively low rate of common crime yet the late 1970s were marked by both rising crime and ever higher unemployment. Thus Pujolism seemed to embody stability, caution and moderation during uncertain times. The key difference between Pujolism and the left Catalanism embodied in the socialists and the communists was the rejection of a federalism that gave equal status to Catalonia with other Spanish regions. Pujolism sought rather a bilateral relationship with Madrid and the continuing consolidation and extension of the powers of Catalan autonomy. The political discourse of *Fer País* and reconstructing Catalonia came from an almost literal interpretation of nation building. Electoral slogans in the CiU lexicon included those such as 'get to work' to the 'raising of Catalonia' to CiU being the party 'to do things'.

Catalonia's transition to democracy had been led by the left, yet post-1980 Catalonia underwent a conservative turn. The CDC party conference of January 1981 defined the key parameters of Pujolism as it was constructed over the next two decades. Pujol set out a strong nationalism combined with a message of political moderation. This moderation was required given the social reality of Catalan society following large-scale immigration. The re-Catalanisation of Catalonia and its national reconstruction, was of necessity a cautious project. As we have seen, Jordi Pujol himself had one of the highest profiles in Spain in terms of recognition. His political skills and a series of fortuitous circumstances handed him Catalan self-government from 1980 to 2003. A further element was the presidentialism embodied in Pujol, where fidelity to Catalonia and to Pujol became coterminous. For the critics of Pujol, this discourse increasingly adopted a messianic tone. As Pujol himself had declared: 'we embody more than any other the spirit of Catalonia . . . if the party fails it would be a great disaster for Catalonia'.<sup>78</sup> González Casanova has noted that where pre-1939 Catalans voted for the conservative regionalists of the *Lliga*, in the 1970s it was for CiU. Equally, where it had been ERC territory in the 1930s, support was now expressed for the PSC.<sup>79</sup> The consolidation of CiU was also achieved by the collapse of the centre-right of the UCD, and CiU absorbed many of their elected officials. CiU increasingly became, even for those reticent about its nationalism, the useful party for rightist voters though CiU's constituency was above all those of the Catalan middle classes. As Pujol himself stated in 1981, 'we are neither left nor right. We are a party that wishes to build and strengthen the national personality of Catalonia'.<sup>80</sup> Pujolism offered no meaningful change to socio-economic structures but rather what can be termed a bourgeois patriotism.

It is clear that the emergence and consolidation of CiU coincided with

transformations in the world economy that favoured a centre-right political formation. In the mid 1970s, Catalonia was still often known as 'Red Catalonia' because of the dominance of left political forces. Yet since the early 1980s, that designation has ceased to be used. As one commentator put it in 1977, following the first democratic elections in Spain, 'Catalonia has become a strong bastion of western leftism'.<sup>81</sup> CiU faced an opponent that was very different to the *Lliga Regionalista*. The *Lliga* was dominant at a time of extreme social conflict, as we have seen, and ideologically many of its leaders and followers came close to supporting fascism, as did many conservatives in the same period.<sup>82</sup> Whilst labour protest was great in the mid 1970s, it had a different motivation from that of the 1930s. The rapid decline in labour mobilisation in the 1970s was caused by the demobilisation strategy adopted by both Catalan and Spanish communism. Thus the years of democratic elections between 1977 and 1980 took place at the very moment where historic leftist power and influence was peaking. Equally trades unions were about to begin their long trajectory downwards. The era that would subsequently be termed that of neo-liberalism was about to begin, producing crisis in all variants of left ideology and political practice.

The first elections in June 1977 also represented the first major breach in the unity of the Catalan opposition. Until this point, the 1970s had revealed a near Catalan unanimity that was in marked contrast to a violent and profoundly divided Basque Country. The creation of the *Assemblea de Catalunya* in 1971 was the symbol of this unity. However the electoral results of 1977, whilst representing a striking victory for the left, also caused divisions to appear. There was an increasing fracture amongst the opposition between a *ruptura pactada* (negotiated break) and a complete breach with the institutions of the regime and a full democratisation, the *ruptura democrática* (democratic break).<sup>83</sup> Division in Catalonia was largely one that mirrored left/right positions and was not yet a fracture over the exact form of the Catalan national project. During this early phase, the left retained its credibility over Catalanism.

It was at this point that the Spanish government, concerned at both the general dominance of leftism and at the electoral and political strength of communism began its contacts with Josep Tarradellas, then President of the *Generalitat*-in-exile. Initially the return of Tarradellas was opposed by both the Pujolists and the PSUC, the latter on account of the pronounced anti-communism of Tarradellas which had its origins in the Civil War and was also shared by many leading figures in his nominal party, the ERC. However, it soon became clear that Tarradellas was no longer a member nor influential in the party. Rather, he sought to project himself as a national transcendent figure. The Pujolists were suspicious of Tarradellas for two reasons. Firstly because he established bilateral relations with Madrid and secondly because his personalist style threatened to eclipse their own 'national' figure, Jordi Pujol. Tarradellas did however receive the support from the growing forces of Catalan socialism. For some, the return of Josep Tarradellas which became known as Operation Tarradellas was simply a stratagem on the part of the Madrid government to isolate the Catalan left. However what was clear was that the



Spanish government which had its origin in the regime, reversed a key piece of Francoist legislation. The person and political position of Tarradellas was important to the whole operation. He rapidly accepted the Spanish monarchy and that Catalan autonomy would come directly from Madrid. He sought to transcend petty political divisions and create a national consensus over the restoration of self-government.<sup>84</sup> The return of Tarradellas and the creation of a provisional *Generalitat* in October 1978 seemed to be a major recognition that a line of continuity existed between the Catalan government of the 1930s which had been overthrown by Franco's forces and Catalan society in the 1970s. Tarradellas famously remarked that 'I am the successor of the one that Franco shot'. Thus a proto-autonomous government was in place between the autumn of 1978 and the first elections to the Catalan parliament in March 1980. The revived institution initially had a budget of 270 million pesetas and employed some 150 personnel. Yet some 95 per cent of money spent in Catalonia was still determined in Madrid.<sup>85</sup> The ability of Catalonia to decide its economic destiny would become a fundamental aspect to political relations between it and Madrid in the following decades.

The period following the first elections of 1977 was one that was marked by both bilateral and multi-party negotiations. The same years also saw the consolidation of the political parties and the outlines of a party system in the territory through the dissolution and fusion of smaller unsuccessful parties. The pro-independence left remained extra-parliamentary and marginal until the mid 1990s. The Catalan role in the drafting of the 1978 Spanish constitution was disproportionate with two of the seven authors of the document from the principality. Both Catalan nationalism and communism were represented by the figures of Miquel Roca i Junyent and Jordi Solé i Tura. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 was the great document of compromise of the era as former Francoists and the opposition reached an accommodation. Articles that were specifically aimed at the Basques and the Catalans were articles 2 and 8 concerned with the territorial integrity of the state whilst a further article was aimed at Valencia, the Balearics and Navarre in its prohibition of the federation of Autonomous Communities. There would be no *Països Catalans* nor greater Basque territory (*Euskal Herria*).<sup>86</sup> Equally the Spanish constitution did not allow for self-determination. In spite of the early restoration of the *Generalitat*, the Catalans obtained less in the transition than the Basques, who obtained full fiscal autonomy, known as the *concierto económico*, from Madrid. The first autonomous Basque government also gained powers over economic infrastructure and had strong policing powers, with the early creation of its own Basque force, the *Ertzaintza*.

The influential position of both the PSC and the PSUC was cemented during the transition by the establishment of municipal government which became dominated by these forces throughout the area of greater Barcelona. The business class within Catalonia was fearful at the apparent dominance of the left and remarkable strength of communism. It was due to fear over prospective left dominance that the Madrid government delayed municipal elections until three and a half years after Franco's death in April 1979. These

first municipal elections then demonstrated a dramatic loss for the forces of conservatism and gave added importance to the construction of a Catalan autonomy that could hold back the red tide. Jordi Pujol and his coalition CiU became the great hope, for both Catalan and Spanish conservative forces, to prevent the seemingly inevitable victory of the left. In the working-class and industrial areas, the Catalan nationalist forces made little impact, whilst the small towns and rural areas were divided between CiU and the newly constituted force of Spanish conservatism, the *Unión del Centro Democrático*.

The next phase in the transition in Catalonia was the drafting of a statute of autonomy for the region. As with the Spanish Constitution, the *Estatut* of 1979, known as that of Sau was a compromise. The document originally agreed was subject to substantial cuts by the Madrid parliament as had happened in 1931 and 1932, and more significantly as occurred when the Statute was revised in 2005 to 2006. The new *Estatut* largely devolved education though the Spanish government still had the capacity to intervene. Equally public order remained in the central government's hands until an autonomous police force was created in 1983 though this body had limited authority until 2008. The *Estatut* was an advance on the autonomy obtained in 1932, and support for it was expressed by an 87 per cent vote in the 1979 referendum. Significantly, the measure received widespread support in the working-class areas with a high Spanish-speaking presence. It was in fact in some of the richer areas of Barcelona that high disapproval was found, largely attributed to the view that the left would certainly control the new autonomous government.

However it would be the slow and often reluctant transfer of powers from Madrid to Barcelona over the 1980s and beyond that would lead to an increasing resentment within Catalan political culture. This already occurred during 1978 and 1979 when the Madrid government seemed particularly slow in transferring powers that had been agreed. CiU would be the main beneficiary of the laggardly and seemingly begrudging transfer. Equally Catalan socialism would be damaged by its apparent inability to use its weight within the Spanish government (which was a socialist one in the period 1982 to 1996). CiU led a permanent low intensity conflict with Madrid and the coalition was able to channel Catalan grievance until the mid 1990s. The coming together of these elements would greatly contribute to the dominance of CiU within Catalan political life. It is during the first CiU-led government between 1980 and 1984, that we can trace the emergence of the triad 'Pujol-CiU-Catalonia' that would be politically effective for the next 20 years.<sup>87</sup> Given its enormous demographic weight and cultural and political significance, greater Barcelona had been the centre of anti-Francoist activity and this tended to distort the actual weight of left political forces in the territory.<sup>88</sup> By the time of the municipal elections of 1979 CiU had obtained 1,765 councillors in the small-sized towns and villages of the interior, in contrast to 915 of the PSC in the areas of greatest population density.<sup>89</sup> There was thus a demographic, political and representative imbalance in the territory.

As has been seen, by late Francoism the left dominated the expressions of popular Catalanism and exercised a certain hegemony in cultural expression.



All public demonstrations until the *Diada* national day celebration of September 1980 had also been a forum for expressions of demands for radical democratisation. After 1980, the *Diada* was given institutional expression and other forms of protest declined. The second phase of the transition saw conservatives and rightists mobilise to prevent the left taking control of the *Generalitat*. The right was also aided by a series of conjunctural factors. Firstly, between 1977 and 1979, the country experienced an intense electoral period, which this time also coincided with rising unemployment and ever more difficult economic conditions. This later phase was one of popular disillusionment. With the still apparent danger of a left victory in the autonomous election, the right began its own mobilisation.

In the late 1970s there was a genuine concern amongst business and conservatives that Catalonia would be the first west European country since the 1940s to have communists in the government. There was a serious fear as the leader of Catalan business put it in February 1980 that 'Marxists' would use the Catalan autonomy statute to become 'an instrument of class struggle and [an attempt] at taking power'.<sup>90</sup> These first elections for a restored Catalan parliament were held at a time of deepening economic crisis and whilst it was increasingly losing the influence it once had, the PSUC through the CCOO retained control of the majority in the workers movement. The organised working class had not yet been broken. The first Catalan autonomous election of 1980 had something of the tone of a 'Red Scare', in a campaign principally led by Catalan business organisations. The possibility of a hegemonic left attaining power had few European parallels. Conservatives and the media conveyed a cataclysmic message should the left be victorious. The Catalan Employers' Organisation invested 500 million pesetas in the election campaign. The radicalism found in the PSC was key to this concern and the party at this time bore few parallels to mainstream west European social democracy. The *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* brought together three sectors of social democracy, embodying Catalanist social democracy and more 'workerist' tendencies which looked more closely to Madrid and the PSOE. The PSC experienced deep divisions at its party congress in 1980 and only seemed to reconcile its factions with the socialist landslide in Spain in October 1982. As with the PSUC, much of the party leadership was represented by an alliance between middle-class Catalans and middle-class Spanish speakers yet the main electoral constituency of both parties was found amongst the Spanish-speaking immigration of the greater Barcelona metropolitan area.<sup>91</sup> The PSC held relatively radical positions partly due to the strength of Catalan communism.<sup>92</sup> Subsequently, social democracy whether a radical version in the form of the PSC or modest reformism embodied in British labourism was subject to crisis. The 'Red Scare' also marked the first autonomous election campaign in Andalusia, it being the other main territory in Spain to have an influential communist movement. Likewise this also found expression in Valencia between 1979 and 1981, where an anti-Catalanist right increasingly mobilised. As the Pujol owned weekly *Destino* put it, if the left won in Catalonia, it would mean 'the first government of democratic Europe to have a communist pres-

ence'.<sup>93</sup> The anti-left campaign accelerated following the victory obtained by the forces of the left after the municipal elections of April 1979. In particular the number of municipal agreements established between communists and socialists seemed to presage the political form to govern the Catalan autonomous government.

All prior indications were that the left would be victorious in the first autonomous election of March 1980 and that a socialist-communist coalition would form the government. As the campaign proceeded, an air of hysteria obtained. With the weakness of the Spanish centre-right with its force the *Centristes de Catalunya* (Catalan Centrists) and its inability by 1979 to mount a successful political challenge, conservatives and business elites began overt support of Pujol and CiU.<sup>94</sup> As Alfred Molins, a leading business figure stated: 'we are going to spend all of our energy and money ... to defend the model of a free market society'.<sup>95</sup> Whilst some in CiU were active in this campaign Pujol was given a more statesman-like, moderate and presidential role though he also declared that 'economic revival requires the recovery of confidence' and 'a victory of the Marxist left would be the worst thing that could happen'.<sup>96</sup>

For many commentators, the transition in Catalonia represented a victory for conservative political forces.<sup>97</sup> The electoral results of 1980 for a Catalan parliament and the surprising victory of CiU was facilitated by a number of variables. The Catalan socialists were the party that suffered the most due to abstention yet there was not a direct correlation between immigration and abstention as the PSUC seemed barely affected by it, having maintained a highly loyal voting base. One surprising element was a stronger-than-expected showing for ERC, which received 30 per cent of its votes from the socialists, a demonstration that differential voting behaviour would play an important role in the Catalan elections. ERC was also key in enabling Jordi Pujol to be president as the *Esquerra* leadership retained hostility to the communists and was thus unwilling to support a socialist government that included the PSUC. ERC was not a pro-independence party rather it represented a historical connection to the Second Republic. It also saw itself as a nationalist formation that was untainted by compromise. The party offered a radical nationalist critique of the compromises of the transition though it failed to offer any real social agenda and largely supported the free market policies of CiU. In the 1984 Catalan elections the *Esquerra* vote collapsed leaving it with only five seats in a Catalan parliament of over 100. Equally whilst *Esquerra* proudly claimed to be 'the oldest party in Catalonia', it was also so because of its aged membership and leadership which seemed incapable of appealing to new generations of voters. Following the decision of ERC to support Pujol rather than the left, the early years of Catalan autonomy were marked by deep party divisions, which were not fully healed until 2003. Thus the Catalan left post-1980 was marked by socialist and communist mistrust of ERC, by an *Esquerra* that seemed to have abandoned any real social agenda and by the gradual erosion of populist Catalanism. ERC was also tainted by periodic expressions of anti-Spanish immigrant discourse and a close to nativist political strategy embodied in party leader Heribert Barrera.



The transition also demonstrated that a key determinant to Catalan politics would be '*sucursalismo*' i.e. subordination to the party centre in Madrid. This idea increasingly fed into the political culture that only CiU and ERC were 'real' Catalan forces and all others were simply branches of Madrid-based parties. The autonomous election results not only indicated that a sector of Spanish-speaking immigration was inclined to abstention but also the emergence of a new electoral phenomenon known as the 'dual vote' meaning that a sector of the electorate would change their voting behaviour depending on the nature of the election. The 1980 election had an abstention rate of 40 per cent and there was a differential of between 10 and 15 per cent between the regional election and Spanish general elections. The socialists would be the great loser as a consequence. Equally, many of those who voted PSC in a Spanish election, switched to CiU in Catalan elections. Whilst a number of key elements were present in the Catalan elections of 1980 to ensure Pujol's victory, the sociological phenomenon of Spanish-speaking electoral abstention appeared to be a demonstration that Catalanism had obtained the neutrality of the immigrants towards the project of nationalist reconstruction. This would be highly significant as only between 10 and 11 per cent of those born outside of Catalonia voted for CiU or ERC, whilst those who were born in the territory had figures of 89 per cent and 88 per cent respectively.<sup>98</sup>

The PSC was stunned by the defeat of 1980 and refused to go into coalition government with CiU, a strategic error that would keep it out of power in the *Generalitat* until 2003. The subsequent second PSC conference held in July 1980 saw the withdrawal at point of one-third of the party and demonstrated that the party was deeply fractured between its more Catalanist and labourist tendencies. This tension was over the future direction of the party, and saw fracturing on the national question, its relationship to class politics and also to the PSOE. The other component in the defeated left partnership of March 1980 was of course the PSUC. Whilst the party officially condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and expressed support for the Polish strikers of Solidarity in 1980, much of the party activist base did not support these official positions. The leading federation of the PSUC in the Baix Llobregat passed a resolution backing the Soviet position as did trades unionists in the CCOO. These events determined the implosion and major split of the party between 1981 and 1982. This culminated in the 5th Congress of the PSUC held in January 1981 which saw pro-Soviet sectors obtain control of the party and the defeat of the Eurocommunists. This represented the greatest crisis of Catalan communism since the 1960s. The party that had led the opposition to Franco and that had been determinant in the creation of the *Assemblea de Catalunya*, the party that obtained a striking parliamentary result for communism in 1977 with over 18 per cent of the vote, was mortally wounded. By the end of 1981, PSUC membership had collapsed from a figure of 35,000 in 1978 to only 12,000.<sup>99</sup> As with the Spanish Communist Party, Catalan communism would be a fringe movement until its reconfiguration as a new social and political formation in the mid 1990s.

The years between the death of Franco in 1975 and the second Catalan elec-

tious in 1984 were marked by a growing political confidence of the right (increasingly represented by CiU) and a growing disorientation of the left, whether radical or social democratic. Social democratic projects in Europe, from British labourism to those of Mitterand, were failing. During this period the market economy became both totemic and seemingly all-victorious: 'Neoliberalism is the modality of political economy that has brought the naturalisation of the market economy to a level of radicality never attained before'.<sup>100</sup> It was of course at this time that Eric Hobsbawm famously spoke of the 'Forward March of Labour Halted' which would be prophetic in terms of the weakening of both communism and social democracy in the years to come. Between 1978 and 1984, CiU skillfully manufactured the perception that, in marked contrast to the final years of Francoism and the hegemony culturally and politically of the left, only they could represent Catalonia. This was aided by the fact that the PSC were, at a Catalan level, damaged by the policies pursued by the PSOE government following its victory in October 1982. The first of these was the LOAPA, a law introduced in response to the attempted coup of February 1981.<sup>101</sup> For both territories, the LOAPA confirmed for nationalists their frequently displayed suspicions of Spanish nationalism. The public sphere was also briefly represented with an anti-LOAPA demonstration marshalling over 150,000 in Barcelona in March 1982. The ambiguity of Catalan socialism both towards the LOAPA and the demonstration would prove to cause the party long-lasting damage. CiU was able to successfully portray the PSC as part of the governing power in 'Madrid' that was negatively affecting Catalonia. The PSC, essentially a coalition of factions pulled in different directions, was deeply divided over its response to the law.<sup>102</sup> Furthermore, though the PSC had a certain degree of autonomy from the PSOE its ultimate subordination to the Socialist headquarters made it vulnerable to these attacks.

Following its creation the PSC had maintained its own parliamentary grouping in the Spanish parliament but following the LOAPA, it lost this right which further undermined its national credentials and greatly facilitated the monopolisation of Catalanism by CiU. Catalanist sectors in the PSC were further undermined by Spanish nationalist/anti-Catalanist voices in the PSOE, ultimately represented by Alfonso Guerra, seen in Catalonia as a new Negrín. At one point, Guerra had called the Catalan autonomy process a 'choteo' - a joke and also a 'farce'.<sup>103</sup> Furthermore, transfers to the *Generalitat* of powers agreed in the Statute of Autonomy essentially halted after the coup attempt of February 1981. The failure of Madrid to transfer these powers became a constant feature of complaint over the course of the 1980s and beyond. CiU was thus constantly able to undermine the PSC and its subordination to the PSOE government.<sup>104</sup> Furthermore, it appeared to Catalan nationalists that legislation passed in the Catalan parliament, including measures such as the Law of Linguistic Normalisation which received a high degree of consensus, were subject to challenge. The attempt to establish a Catalan language TV station also appeared to be subject to Madrid's delaying tactics. The subsequent dominance of Pujolism was facilitated by a divided Catalan left, by a com-



munist movement that had reached its historic peak, by a faction ridden socialist party and by ERC that lacked a clear ideology beyond being a strongly nationalist force. By the early 1980s, Catalonia experienced the collapse of the cultural and political dominance of the left that had been constructed under late Francoism. In spite of its apparent dominance, the left had been unable to force a complete break from Francoism in the period 1975 to 1977 and it was a left in a much weaker position by 1979–1980. As de-industrialisation proceeded in future years, the new economic and societal structures did not lead to its resurgence.

As we have seen, what has become known as Pujolism was a significant factor in late Francoism. Jordi Pujol himself had come to be the most well-known embodiment of Catalanism inside and outside Catalonia by the 1970s, and met with leading figures during the transition including the king and Manuel Fraga. It was little noticed in the mid 1970s but CDC was the fastest growing party as early as 1977 and was the biggest by 1981.<sup>105</sup> In the election of 1977, *Convergència Democràtica* (CDC) and *Unió Democràtica* (UDC) had campaigned separately, but thereafter they joined forces to create the coalition *Convergència i Unió*. All of the above mentioned elements combined in the election of 1984 with a demoralised communist force, a UCD that had imploded and a socialist party damaged by being part of the Spanish government since October 1982. Thus in the 1984 election in Catalonia, which gave an overall majority to the coalition led by Pujol, CiU received 46 per cent of the vote, and contrary to many simplistic interpretations of Catalan voting behaviour, a third of its votes came from Spanish-speaking immigrants. The Catalan socialists lost over 700,000 votes from the figure in October 1982 and the communists had lost 395,000 since 1980.<sup>106</sup> The Catalan left had suffered two consecutive electoral defeats. The increasingly centre-right economic policy implemented by the Spanish socialist government in Madrid was but one further element undermining the Catalan socialists who had remained committed to a more radical economic programme. Furthermore, the entry into the Spanish government of leading Catalan socialists and their collective responsibility over government policy provided further ammunition to the argument that they appeared unable to defend the interests of Catalonia. In 1983 the Spanish Supreme Court annulled many of the articles of the LOAPA. This vindicated the position of CiU and other Catalan nationalists. The sentence of the Court was damaging to the Spanish government of Felipe González, but damaged the Catalan socialists even more. In the October 1982 landslide electoral victory of Spanish socialism, the PSC had contributed 1,575,000 votes yet its vote dropped to 798,000 in the Catalan autonomous election of April 1984.

It became clear that CiU represented a new correlation of political forces in the territory. Perhaps surprisingly, CiU's victory (against the Catalan 'branch' of the PSOE), was interpreted in much of the conservative Madrid press as a victory for 'moderation', that is one against 'socialism'. The ultra conservative figure and leader of the Spanish parliamentary right, Manuel Fraga, had already referred to CiU, AP and UCD as the 'natural majority'.<sup>107</sup>

Certainly it was not only on questions of political economy that these formations found common cause as they shared many social, cultural and religious values. For distinct reasons then, in the years immediately following the transition, both the PSC and the PSUC lost credibility as Catalan national forces. CiU would successfully rule Catalonia as a majority government until 1995 and a minority administration until 2003. CiU would be embroiled in innumerable clashes with the PSOE concerning the devolution of powers to Catalonia and challenges to Catalan legislation from 'Madrid'. However, its 23 years in power would prove to be fundamental in determining many aspects of Catalan political life.

The policies of CiU in power since 1980 have their own historical continuities. The incremental award of concessions from Madrid was a continuation of the strategy of Pujolism inaugurated in the 1960s and early 1970s as we have seen. This Pujol-led programme was termed *Fer país*, 'making a country'; that is, its economic, social and cultural reconstruction. *Fer país* was central to the programme of Catalan nationalism in power. In an interview published in 1978, Pujol spoke of his programme begun in the 1960s: 'It was vital to proceed towards the reconstruction of the whole country.'<sup>108</sup> The Pujolist-led projects of *Fer país* and the 'construction' of Catalonia were then, part of the regionalist response to the transformations in the world economy that began to be discerned in the 1970s. The Catalan nationalism of CiU also continued to contain the historic residue of the *Lliga Regionalista* project for Catalan leadership in the modernisation of Spain, though this idea was less central in the ideology of Jordi Pujol.<sup>109</sup> In 1982, the leading figure in CiU, Miquel Roca, launched a new programme for Catalonia to lead in Spanish modernisation, and it was a direct challenge to the project of the PSOE.<sup>110</sup> The trajectory of this Roca-led project determined an important change in Catalan nationalism, as will be seen.

The LOAPA had led to the first large-scale expression of Catalan civil society under democracy with a nationalist demonstration in Barcelona in March 1982. This received the support of CiU, the PSUC and ERC and can be seen as the final expression of unity of purpose that emerged during the transition. However, the institutionalisation of autonomy and the *Generalitat* meant that for most of the period post-1980, civil society was weak and ineffective. This was in spite of its enormous growth in the previous decade. It was notable that the first *Diada* under autonomy of September 1980 saw a substantially lower turnout. The left increasingly distanced itself from Pujolist Catalanism and it was notable that the nationalist activism had a markedly different support base to that of the protest movements of late Francoism and 1976 to 1977. Fewer workers and immigrants felt represented as CiU determined the contours of national reconstruction. The left's belief in 'the *Generalitat* of the workers' faded. After 1980, Catalan identity became 'institutionalised' through the *Generalitat*. CiU, as the political representative of Catalan nationalism, sought the creation of a cultural infrastructure. The gradual expansion of the Catalan government saw a rapid acceleration in public employment and a new Catalan civil service, with new social sectors brought into the Pujolist project. Cultural